I. INTRODUCTION
There is growing concern over children's privacy in today's technological world. However, most of the research on children's privacy focuses on third party threats.
1 Little work has been done on children's privacy at home and in their relationship with their parents, that is, privacy from their parents. 2 This Article attempts to initiate a discussion on this timely issue. For most adults, the place where our privacy is most protected is in the home. For children, however, having privacy in their home is far from a certainty, and it is becoming ever less so. While it is true that parents have always been able to invade their children's privacy by going through their the monitoring of children is seen as "a central characteristic of modern childhood."
9
There is a widespread consensus that children show less concern than adults about privacy.
10 However, very few empirical studies have demonstrated this. 11 It seems more accurate to argue that privacy is important to children, though their conceptions of privacy and the private differ from those of adults. 12 In relation to parental monitoring and surveillance, children express concern about their parents viewing personal information, and reproach their parents for their snooping.
13
To be sure, the primary role and responsibility of parents is to protect their children. This parental responsibility has been recognized as a constitutional parental right-a component of the parental right to privacy.
14 Two presumptions underlie this parental, or parent-child relational, right. First, courts believe that a "parent possess [es] what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." 15 Second, 11. See Youth, Privacy and Reputation, supra note 2, at 12. 12. See id. at 13. 13. See supra note 1. 14. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (invalidating a law mandating that all school language instruction be in English and discussing the parental duty to educate one's children as " [c] orresponding to the right of control" parents possess); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding a law requiring children's attendance at public schools unconstitutional because it interfered "with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education" of their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that Amish parents could not be compelled against their religious beliefs to send their children to public school due in part to "the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children") (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
15. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) .
lawmakers presume that the "natural bonds of affection" lead parents to act in their children's best interests. 16 Since children are immature (at least until a certain age), they are in need of adult guidance, and society has delegated the task of child-raising to those most likely to perform it well. Thus, when children's physical or emotional safety is at stake, whatever interest in privacy they may have is outweighed by society's interest in their protection. However, not all situations involve a child's safety, and even when the goal is to prevent harm to the child, the harm of infringing upon the child's privacy should also be taken into account. Nonetheless, in this context, children's privacy is overlooked and given scant consideration, if any. The reason for this, we argue, lies in the failure to recognize a "privacy problem," to use Daniel Solove's terminology, 17 in many situations that involve children. If no interest in privacy is recognized and no invasion of privacy is acknowledged, then any opposing interest will prevail, and the question of balancing privacy against that opposing interest will simply not arise.
In this Article we identify and address the difficulties in recognizing children's privacy within their family unit. We locate two different types of difficulty. The first is connected to the privacy discourse itself, which has so far been developed almost exclusively in reference to the privacy of adults and is applied only awkwardly to the rights of children. We also note the different perceptions regarding the value and importance of privacy for adults in comparison to perceptions that undervalue children's privacy. Where children are concerned, privacy is considered to be dangerous and inherently associated with risk. We demonstrate that theories of privacy can be adapted to include children and point to the value and significance of privacy for children.
The other difficulty in recognizing a "privacy problem" for children in their homes and family relationships concerns the nature of the parent-child relationship, as well as the general tension between the privacy of the family as a relational entity and the privacy of its individual members. Taking into consideration the implications of a notion of children's privacy for the parent-child relationship, we point to the value and significance of individual privacy for significant family relations, including a right for children to privacy from their parents.
Looking critically at the prevailing legal situation in American jurisprudence, in which privacy is recognized for adults but less so for children, and does not exist for children vis-à-vis their parents, this Article suggests a balanced children's right to privacy from their parents. In order to build this balanced right we draw on concepts from the influential work of scholars who see privacy as dignity and respect, as well as on principles from the international arena, specifically the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child [hereinafter UNCRC], 18 to argue why children's right to privacy should be recognized in their relationship with their parents, and to what extent. We contend that children should have an individual right for privacy against their parents, while recognizing that this right should be qualified according to the child's age and evolving capacities. We integrate both national and international notions into a combined thesis that opens up a discussion on children's privacy from their parents and other family members.
Section II introduces the prevailing approaches to privacy and explains why these conceptions can be applied only awkwardly to the rights of children. Section III surveys the almost non-existent recognition of children's rights under American law, especially regarding their privacy in their relationships with their parents. We address children's privacy vis-à-vis their parents in various contexts: abortion, education, online privacy, and wiretapping. We note that parents' right to direct the upbringing of their children prevails over children's right to privacy, and also direct attention to the sometimes mistaken assumption of a unity of interests between parents and children in issues that concern children's privacy. We then consider children's right to privacy under the UNCRC and observe that the UNCRC is particularly vague with regard to children's privacy. Section IV moves toward a recognition of children's privacy in the family. It explores the dilemma of intrafamilial privacy in an attempt to analyze children's privacy within the family. It is suggested that privacy is an essential dignity interest for children and-though necessarily constrained by the limits of childhood autonomy-should be protected as a concept essential to human development, even within the realm of childhood. Section V binds the international principle of the evolving capacities of the child, presented in an earlier section, with our call for an independent individual right for children vis-à-vis their parents, and thus presents an individual balanced right. Section VI concludes.
II. PRIVACY AND CHILDREN

A. Prevailing Understandings of Privacy and their Adaptation to Children
Neither the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, nor any of the Amendments to the Constitution, contains an express provision protecting the right of privacy. However, the Supreme Court has recognized privacy as a concept that is deeply rooted within the Constitution's framework. 19 The Court has also made it clear that this right extends, at least in some instances, to children. In this Article, we do not wish to delve into the chaos of privacy jurisprudence. Rather, our aim is to direct attention to the neglected aspect of children's privacy in the home. 26 The extensive scholarly engagement with conceptualizing privacy has been written almost entirely with the adult rights-bearer in mind and has paid no special attention to the application of the concept to children in general, and vis-à-vis their parents in particular. approach envisions the right to privacy as the right to limit the ways in which others have access to you. Thus, under this approach, privacy includes secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. Privacy-as-control means the right to exercise control over oneself and over information about oneself. Under this approach, a person would have the right to determine what others know about him or her and how they are able to obtain such information.
It has been suggested that privacy-as-control and privacy-asaccess are, in essence, quite similar, and can therefore be reconciled. 33 The main difference is that access focuses more on interpersonal relationships, while control focuses on the individual in isolation. Be that as it may, both of these approaches have also been considered either too limited or too broad to conceptualize privacy.
34
Daniel Solove has recently argued for abandoning attempts to find a unitary common denominator for privacy, which, in his view, have thus far proven unsuccessful. Instead, he suggests that we understand privacy as "an umbrella term that refers to a wide and disparate group of related things."
35 Whether one adopts one of the abovementioned conceptions of privacy or accepts Solove's argument that privacy should be understood in a more pluralistic way, it is clear that each of the existing understandings of privacy raises difficulties when applied to children. The traditional understanding of privacy as the right to be left alone has been criticized, mainly by communitarian scholars, for erecting walls between individuals and depicting people as isolated, rather than connected, as well as for preferring the rights of the individual over the common good.
36 This criticism is of particular relevance when considering children's privacy rights in that children are inherently dependent upon and connected to others. Also, in most cases, they should not and must not be "let alone." Indeed, if this is the only way to understand the right to privacy, then recognizing children's right to privacy would surely have to be seen as "abandoning" them to their rights.
37
Understanding privacy as access or control also raises difficulties when applied to children because of their limited autonom.
38 Privacy-as-control assumes the possibility, whether 38. Many children (in particular older children) want control over their lives and sometimes seek to limit access to their diaries, mobile phones and computers. Chidlren even find ways to circumvent parental efforts at monitoring, and thus use several strategies to maintain their privacy from their parents such as, inter alia, using multiple e-mail addresses, texting to friends, and using passwords. (1996) . According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there is some importance in signing a Convention even without ratifying it. A signature alone does not make the United States a true State Party; however, a applying autonomy-based rights to children, and especially to young children, the UNCRC also adopted a guiding principle referring to the evolving capacities of the child.
46
One of the first individuals to argue for a legal recognition of children's evolving capacities was Hillary Rodham Clinton in an oftcited article published in 1973.
47 52. See supra note 37.
C. Privacy as Both an Autonomy-Based and a Needs-Based Right for Children
Children's right to privacy is specifically recognized under Article 16 of the UNCRC, which states: "(1) No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation; (2) The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
53
It is our view that the right to privacy, as articulated by the UNCRC, does not fit neatly within either the category of autonomy or that of need. While, as we noted, many common perceptions of privacy emphasize its connection with autonomy, it is also a need of every individual, including children. The fact that children need privacy from individuals and entities external to the family is well recognized, both in law and academic literature. There is a wide recognition that children need privacy to protect them against the manipulations of commercial entities, 54 as well as against the government, child pornographers, pedophiles and others. these contexts, children's interest in and right to privacy is considered to be best protected by their parents. After all, it is parents who are obliged by law and by nature to provide for their children's needs, and who are considered to be in the best position to do so. However, children need privacy from their parents as well.
Children need physical privacy in order to develop their individuality, their independence and their self-reliance, as well as for the sake of their creativity and other attributes important to personal development.
56 Children's privacy needs include a space in the home that belongs to them and that is respected by both parents and siblings. 57 In addition, children, even young ones, have a need for interaction management, choosing when and how to interact with others, as well as information management, choosing when to disclose information to others.
58 This need can and should be fulfilled first and foremost in the home. 59 However, it requires recognizing children's right to privacy within the family, which raises a thorny dilemma.
III. THE DILEMMA OVER INTRAFAMILIAL PRIVACY
In the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the right to privacy, privacy in the familial context occupies a special place. Nonetheless, the focus of this jurisprudence has been on relational privacy, that is, the privacy of a relationship or relational unit, such as the marital relationship 60 or the parent-child relationship, as against Consideration of the right to privacy as operating between individual family members raises a tension between two perceptions of the family unit.
63 The first is the individualistic approach, which considers the family to be a collection of individuals, each of whom has separate interests and rights. The second is the familycollectivist approach, which conceives of the family as a unit, having almost a separate legal personality.
64
On one hand, the treatment of the family as a unit upon which rights may be conferred has been heavily criticized for causing systematic harm to the most vulnerable members of the family, usually women and children. research has been devoted to exposing how the family as a "unit" or an "entity" is no more than a social construction, a fiction that "has hidden a multitude of wrongs."
66 This is particularly true of the concept of "the family's privacy," which has served as an ideological tool with which to shield the stronger members of the family (usually men, in their role as husbands and fathers) in cases of abuse of the weak (usually women and children). 67 Feminists have thus insisted that the "private" is "public."
68
On the other hand, recognizing the rights (in general, not just the right to privacy) of individual family members against each other does not seem to fully fit the family setting, where family members are believed to share some sense of collectivity, a sense "that 'we' family-based, when "family-based privacy rights have historically resulted in a substantial loss of individual rights, especially for women and children"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1247, 1251-59 (1999) (describing the dangers of an entity-based doctrine of family, including the subjugation of a woman's will to that of her husband, the inability of a child to exit abusive family situations, and the condoning of domestic violence).
66. Woodhouse, supra note 65, at 1252. In fact, any theoretical framework that confers upon a "unit" or an "entity" rights, in practice, bestows power on the stronger members of this entity. Id. at 1254. See also Yael Tamir, Siding With the Underdogs, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 47, 47-52 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (discussing similar problems in bestowing rights upon groups in order to preserve "the group's" tradition and protect "the group's" interests).
67. See Woodhouse, supra note 65, at 1254 (noting that "the drawing of a 'duty free zone' of privacy, off-limits to 'state intervention' except in cases of shocking acts of violence and emotional abuse, has masked, and even invited, endemic and deeply destructive abuses of power" 70. Mary Ann Glendon criticizes the American discourse of rights that shifted the image of familial relationships "from a community of interests to an alliance of independent individuals." Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 123 (1991). See also Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 33 (1982) (arguing that in the "more or less ideal family situation," members of the family interact in a spirit of generosity, with genuine affection. An appeal to the rights of the individual members is seldom made in this situation, "not because injustice is rampant" but because appealing to such rights "is pre-empted by a spirit of generosity" in which the family members are rarely inclined to claim their fair share).
71. The debate surrounding the various versions of the attachment theory, and in particular whether there exists one single bond that is more critical to the child than all other attachments, or whether children need and are dependent upon a network of attachments, each of which is important to the child, is irrelevant for purposes of this paper. recognized and protected has been long and difficult.
72 Recognizing merely relational privacy as a protection of the parent-child relationship as a unit is problematic, since there is a danger that children and their interests will be obscured from view and that those interests will simply be subsumed within the unity of the family.
Obviously, this dichotomous presentation of the "entity's rights perception" against the "individual rights perception" is somewhat distorted. Individual rights shape and create relationships, including familial relationships. 73 The individual right to privacy, in particular, plays an important role in enabling, creating, and shaping intimate familial relationships. We suggest that understanding children's privacy as a relational individual right (alongside the protection of privacy of the relationship) assists in better defining and shaping the parent-child relationship, as shall be elaborated upon later in the Article.
74
We move next to a critical examination of children's right to privacy as recognized by the law, with a special emphasis on children's privacy in their relationship with their parents. We demonstrate how the difficulties we raised in the above discussion-the awkward application of existing privacy discourse to children, and the difficulties in recognizing an individual right to privacy within the parent-child familial relationship-lead to an inadequate conception of children's intra-familial privacy under the law. 74. See infra Section V.
to privacy. We demonstrate that, while children's need for privacy has been recognized, discussion of this need for privacy has mainly referred to individuals and entities external to the family, with parents conceived as the primary guarantors of their children's privacy. Some recognition has also been given to the evolving capacities and autonomy of children where their privacy is concerned, but again, when children's privacy has been asserted against their parents, complex dilemmas have arisen. We look into the examples of abortion, online privacy, educational privacy, and wiretapping in order to elucidate the complications underlying the current understanding of children's privacy. We note that either parent's right to direct the upbringing of their children has prevailed over their children's right to privacy or that the law assumes a unity of interests between parents and children.
Next we consider the international arena and examine children's right to privacy under the UNCRC. We note that even under the UNCRC there is confusion as to children's privacy in their relationship with their parents. In Bellotti¸ it seemed that the Court was at first receptive to children's informational privacy when it held that a minor is entitled to go directly to a court to receive approval for an abortion without having to first notify her parents. 85 The Court held that if a minor is found mature, a court must authorize her to act without parental consent. If she is not found mature and competent to make the decision regarding abortion on her own, it would be for the court to decide whether to permit an abortion based on her best interest.
86
The Court specifically declared that parents' interest in their minor daughter's abortion decision does not outweigh her right to privacy. The vagueness over children's privacy in their relationship with parents surfaces in case law beyond the Supreme Court as well. Though no case addresses this question directly, several cases have arisen in which a parent has eavesdropped on a telephone conversation to which the child was a party, a situation that indirectly touches upon this question.
A federal statute provides for criminal and civil liability for people engaged in electronic spying in certain situations.
93 However, there is an exception to that prohibition when one party consents to the wiretap or recording. 94 Although it is not written into the statute, must so authorize if he or she finds that the minor is mature and capable of giving informed consent, or that an abortion without notification is in the minor's best interests. § 132:26(II). These judicial bypass proceedings shall be confidential and shall be given precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay, and access to the courts shall be afforded to the pregnant minor 24 hours a day, seven days a week. courts have generally applied the doctrine of "vicarious consent," which allows a parent to consent to wiretapping on a minor child's behalf.
95 Thus, a parent can record a child's conversation, even if she objects, because the parent consents for the child, thus implicating the rule that permits recording when one party has consented. This doctrine reflects an assumption about the unity of interests between parent and child. However, courts have not granted parents unfettered autonomy, saying instead that, in order for the vicarious consent doctrine to apply, the parent must be acting in good faith and have a reasonable belief that he is acting in the child's best interest.
96
In 1993, the District Court of Utah became the first to make use of the doctrine of vicarious consent. 97 The court noted that vicarious consent is necessary because minors cannot give consent, and parents need to be able to monitor their children's conversations in certain situations where it is in the child's best interest. 98 Indeed, the court even noted that the parent has a statutory responsibility to act in the best interest of the child, thus hinting that parents who do not monitor their children's conversations when it is in their best interests might not be fulfilling their legal duties of protection.
99
The vicarious consent doctrine was expanded in 1998 by the Sixth Circuit in Pollock v. Pollock. 100 The court held that parents can consent not only on behalf of small children but on behalf of older children as well, so the child's own ability and capacity to actually consent is not mutually exclusive with the parent's ability to consent on the child's behalf. 101 In the original vicarious consent case,
Thompson, the children were extremely young (aged three and five), a fact which was emphasized by the District Court. 102 However, in Pollock, although the child was 14 years old, the Court of Appeals still held that a parent can record a child's conversation out of a true concern for the child, given the parent's good faith and an objectively reasonable belief that doing so is in the child's best interest.
103
However, the Court of Appeals did stress that a parent cannot record 
107
These wiretapping cases open the way to a process of balancing children's right to privacy and parents' duty to protect their children. As we discuss in greater detail below, we call for recognition of the requirement of such a balance. However, we must first acknowledge that a "privacy problem" exists in children's relationships with their parents before we can attempt to find that balance. In this respect we consider the vicarious consent doctrine an improper means, because, when applied, it assumes a unity of interests between children and parents. The doctrine also does not recognize that their interests might be separate, and that, if so, the protection of the child should prevail.
C. Children's Online Privacy Act and Educational Privacy
The federal government enforces strict requirements regarding children's online privacy.
108 
112
The assumption of a unity of interests between children and parents regarding children's privacy is even greater in the context of children's educational informational privacy. Thus, for example, the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act (FERPA) provides parents centrality of the principle of parental control to the Commission in creating these policies).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2006) (defining a child as "an individual under the age of 13"); § 6502(b)(1)(A) (creating requirements for "operator[s] of any website or online service directed to children that collects personal information from children or the operator of a website or online service that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child"). . . require viewers to submit verifiable parental consent before collecting, using or disclosing any personal information from children under the age of 13") (internal citations omitted).
112. In Canada, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) concluded that Canada's legislative framework insufficiently protected children's online privacy and suggested, among other amendments, a general prohibition on the collection, use, and disclosure of all personal information of children under thirteen. Youth, Privacy and Reputation, supra note 2, at 43. with control over their children's educational information 113 and does not recognize interests of children as separate from those of their parents. 114 FERPA enables parents to access their children's school records, even if their children object, and provides them with control over the disclosure of these records. Unlike COPPA, FERPA does not limit parents' control over their children's informational privacy until the age of thirteen (or until they are found mature or competent enough, as in the context of abortion), but rather provides them with complete control until their children reach the age of eighteen. 115 A similar approach is reflected in the Protection of Pupils Rights Amendment (PPRA). 116 The policy represented by COPPA, FERPA, and PPRA concerning children's privacy rights and their parents' legal position regarding these rights has led several scholars to argue that what is actually being protected is the privacy of the parents, or at best "the family's" privacy.
117
An entirely different approach from that of COPPA, FERPA, and PPRA is taken by the American Library Association (ALA), which recommends that "[l]ibrarians should not breach a child's confidentiality by giving out information readily available to the parent from the child directly. Libraries should take great care to limit the extenuating circumstances in which they will release such information."
118 However, even these child-centered ALA guidelines 116. See Stuart, supra note 114, at 1173-74 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232h and discussing its invasion of children's privacy).
117. See, e.g., id. at 1168 (discussing FERPA's protection for family privacy but not for that of the students); Jennifer Zwick, Casting a Net Over the Net: Attempts to Protect Children in Cyberspace, 10 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1133, 1160 (2000) (arguing that children's informational privacy has generally been regulated not in terms of a right belonging to the child, but "as an interest of the parent or guardian").
118 recognize at best a duty of librarians not to disclose private information about children to their parents.
Noting that the parents can get the information from their children directly, we would like to think that parents would ask their children for it. But do parents have a duty to respect their children's privacy that limits the means they might use to obtain information regarding their children?
D. Children's Privacy and Parents under the UNCRC
The dilemma over children's privacy within the family is also reflected in international law documents such as the UNCRC. As mentioned above, the UNCRC explicitly grants children a right to privacy. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this right is recognized only against the state or whether it applies in the familial context as well. The doubt arises because, while trumpeting the rights of the child, the UNCRC, like other international documents on human rights, also acknowledges that the family is the most fundamental, basic, and important unit of society.
119 It also emphasizes the importance of preserving families' autonomy, harmony, and privacy wherever possible.
120
A number of international conventions recognize the special status of the family in international law and the protection that society and the state should grant it.
121 Some of these conventions strongly emphasize the dignity that society must accord the family unit, 122 the child's need for recognized family relations without unlawful state interference as a part of her identity, 123 and the general need of the family to be free from arbitrary interference in its affairs, 124 unless that interference is compatible with democratic law and the need to defend the interests of society and the state.
125
Thus, this section demonstrates that both in American jurisprudence and international documents children's privacy interests against their parents are rarely recognized. We argue that this failure to recognize a privacy interest among children is inappropriate, especially in the modern era.
[hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador]. Some of these international documents deal with the right of the child to belong to a family unit and to be protected by it; these documents include ICCPR, art. 24; American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 122. See European Convention, supra note 121, art. 8(1). 123. See UNCRC, supra note 18, art. 8. Article 9 calls on the States Parties to ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except in certain judicial decisions. Id. Article 16 states that "no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . ." See id. Article 20(1) deals with alternative care, stating that "[a] child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State." Id.
124. UDHR, supra note 121, art. 12.
125. See European Convention, supra note 121, arts. 8(2), 12; Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 121, art. 15(2). Article 16 of the European Social Charter emphasizes the family's right to appropriate social, legal, and economic protection to ensure its full development. European Social Charter, supra note 119, art. 16. Article 18(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights even states that "[t]he state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community." African Charter, supra note 121, art. 18(2). This Charter emphasizes, in Article 27(1), the obligation of every family member (and not only that of the state and society) towards the family unit, which includes, in Article 29(1), the obligation "to preserve the harmonious development of the family." Id.
V. TOWARDS THE RECOGNITION OF CHILDREN'S PRIVACY IN THE FAMILY
A. The Significance of Intrafamilial Privacy for Children
As noted in the Introduction, the common perception is that privacy is of little concern and consequence for children. This is far from accurate. Children tend to define privacy and the private differently from adults. However, because research on children and privacy has been based on adults' perspectives and perceptions of privacy, children's concerns about privacy have been overlooked.
126
While children may indeed blog about their personal lives and share intimate details online, for them the Internet is a private place where they can socialize with friends, gossip, and share secrets.
127 Children mostly communicate online with people they already know, and information sharing, which to adults may seem like privacy-clueless behavior, is aimed mainly at reinforcing existing relationships with peers. 128 The family, and especially parents, is excluded from this sphere, and children generally do not want their parents to view the information they share online. See, e.g., Livingstone, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that young people in focus groups analogized their dislike of internet snooping to their dislike of more traditional snooping); Ito et al., supra note 1, at 19 (noting that teens generally view parental monitoring of their internet behavior as an invasion of privacy); Grant, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that issues of privacy provoked strong reactions from adolescents).
We also noted that individual privacy in the home and within intrafamilial relationships is significant for children's personal development. Limiting or tracking surfing may seriously harm the child's social popularity and socialization, and thus prevent her from attaining certain social benefits.
131 Studies even show that it may turn children into isolated young people or objects of suspicion. Parental surveillance and intensive supervision remove the child from the realm of human interactions, making real trust and real intimate relationships impossible. If we want children to forge meaningful human connections, we must allow them the ability to be trusted. A parent who intensively tracks his child denies him trust and the ability to be trusted, which is a basic building block of all human interactions. For children to know they are trusted, they should be able to act without their parents' constant monitoring; they must know that they can betray their parents' trust.
138 Children's right to privacy with respect to their parents confers upon them this entitlement. We should also remember that trust is reciprocal. Thus, if children are not trusted, they will not learn to trust.
139
As we note in greater detail in the following section, occasionally parents may have good reasons to inspect and monitor their children. We emphasize, however, that surveillance of children should not be understood as an inherent or standard practice of good parenting, but rather as the exception. In this respect we consider the current equation of surveillance with good parenting to be utterly misguided. Monitoring children, especially in today's digital era, can be linked with two opposite versions of parenting that are both inadequate. The first is remotecontrol parenting. Current monitoring devices enable even uninvolved and absent parents to track their children and feel that by so doing they satisfactorily fulfill their parental role. 141 The second is over-or intensive-parenting, which can disrupt the healthy psychological development of the child.
142
C. Balancing Children's Right to Privacy
Unfortunately, current literature on privacy (especially online privacy) and children focuses only on risks, 143 and pays very little attention to the significance and value for children of privacy from their parents. In this Article we have pointed to the value of children's privacy not only for children themselves but also for the parent-child relationship. It is our hope that by demonstrating the value of children's intrafamilial privacy it will be recognized that there is indeed a "privacy problem" in the parent-child relationship. While we have pointed to the significance of trust in the parent-child relationship, we also acknowledge that taking the risk of error in trusting children might entail detrimental outcomes for them. Pedophiles, child pornographers, and commercial predators are indeed lurking online. Nor can offline risks, such as alcohol consumption and drug abuse, be ignored.
It should be noted, however, that some literature suggests that these dangers are overstated. 144 Moreover, while risk is usually associated with children's privacy, risk and danger are almost inexorably linked with privacy, even that of adults. As Joseph Pulitzer stated: "There is not a crime, there is not a dodge, there is not a trick, there is not a swindle, there is not a vice which does not live by secrecy."
145 And yet, adults' privacy is guaranteed and balanced against such risks (to which children, of course, could also fall victim). Allowing children some time and space alone does not imply abandoning them. Thus, alongside our call for recognizing children's privacy in their relationship with their parents, we argue that this right should be balanced against children's right to protection, nurture, and care. Alan Westin's observation that "either too much or too little privacy can create imbalances which seriously jeopardize the individual's well-being" is as true for children as it is for adults.
146
How children's privacy should be weighed and balanced against other interests-whether the interests of the child herself, a parent, the family, or social interests-should be determined in each specific context. We do, however, wish to make two points in this regard. First, we note that while the need and justification for recognizing a right to privacy increases as the child matures, so does the need to protect her. Thus, on the one hand, the notion of the evolving capacities of the child suggests that, as children mature, greater recognition should be given to their right to privacy. On the other hand, the risks entailed by privacy are much higher for youth than for younger children.
147 Second, and even more importantly, when parents' obligation to respect their children's privacy conflicts with their primary duty to protect and care for their children, the latter should obviously prevail. 148 However, recognizing that children are entitled to privacy entails that there must be prior consideration as to whether protecting a child necessitates an invasion of her privacy, and whether an invasion of privacy would advance the child's safety. Compromise solutions might be found, if they are looked for, such that both children's privacy and their safety are guaranteed. . 3, 2004) , a man filed an invasion of privacy suit against his former girlfriend for revealing intimate details about their sexual relations in an autobiographical book chronicling her coping with a seemingly undiagnosable vaginal pain. Although the author's story inextricably involved her former boyfriend in an intimate way, the court ruled in favor of her right to publish it, while at the same time acknowledging the boyfriend's injury and personal humiliation. Solove recognizes a similar motivation underlying Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993), where an ex-husband sued for damages for violation of his privacy in a book containing his ex-wife's story, where she described his alcoholism, as well as his irresponsible and egocentric behavior. Solove, supra note 10, at 27.
Bonome and Haynes both raise doubts as to whether, under American privacy jurisprudence, children have legitimate claims against their parents for revealing intimate information about them that they themselves would rather keep secret. We argue, though, that the case of children is stronger than the claim of adults in this respect. Adults choose the relationships they enter into and the individuals they trust (even if these individuals later break that trust). Children have no such choice, certainly not with their parents. Theoretically, the relationship of trust between parents and children might render disclosure of information about their children a breach of confidentiality. The latter, unlike the tort of public disclosure of private facts, does not require that the information disclosed be "highly offensive." However, the American version of this tort applies only in a few narrow contexts that include physicians, bankers, and other This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the current article and merits a separate discussion.
Ultimately, we point to a clear need for privacy for children from their parents, a need that derives, inter alia, from the notion of privacy as dignity and respect. As such, parents should respect their children's privacy. But it is not an overall and absolute right. Privacy should be granted to children from their parents according to their age and capacity, always bearing in mind the necessity of at least some private spaces for children where they can socialize away from the prying eyes of their parents.
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Thus, we say it loud and clear: children need privacy, in their homes, and from their parents. Even the UNCRC, which is the most comprehensive legal document ever written on children's rights, and which brought more than twenty countries around the world to adopt a ban on parental corporal punishment 152 and to grant a plethora of children's rights, has not clarified this children's right. The need to watch over children's steps and to safeguard them from all kinds of danger, both online and offline, should sometimes qualify this right. The correct balance should be sought in each case according to its circumstances, the (real) best interest of the child, the nature of the danger, the age of the child, and her capacities.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no clear answer to the question of how to protect children's privacy vis-à-vis their parents in the contemporary digital era.
153 The balanced right proposed in this Article offers solutions to parent-child privacy conflicts both in the traditional "offline" world and the digital online world.
Having called for children's interest in privacy in their relationship with their parents to be recognized, and having argued that there is a privacy problem when parents monitor their children, we are left with the thorny question of whether a recognition of children's privacy should be translated into the legal system, and if so, how. On one hand, a right without a remedy has no value, as the professionals with whom individuals share relationships of trust. See Solove, supra note 10, at 137. 155. A good example is how some countries in Europe handle the question of corporal punishment for children. All Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria and a few other countries have chosen to grant a civil/human right to the child not to be subjected to corporal punishment, rather than criminalizing the parent. The emphasis is on the right rather than on the forbidden act, and to enact the norm and bring it to the attention of citizens-not necessarily to enforce it. See Susan H. Bitensky, Corporal Punishment of Children: A Human Rights Violation 154-92 (2006) (explaining the efforts of 15 countries to delegitimate all corporal punishment of children); Shmueli, supra note 63, at 108-23 (arguing that the approach of Scandanavian countries creates an appropriate balance between ex ante and ex poste approaches that conforms well to the needs of the modern family follow the law, even if it is not enforced. 159 We believe in the law's expressive power and its ability to affect social (and parental) norms. 160 Thus, the significant point in our view lies in the law's expressive message regarding children's entitlement to privacy from their parents, even if this right is not absolute but balanced. At the same time, there is also an evident need to educate parents, not only about the risks that privacy may entail for their children, but also about its value and benefits for both parents and children alike.
159. Id. 75 (discussing the self-executing rights embodied in the First and Fourth Amendments).
160. Solove provides interesting examples of the ways that law has established privacy in communication in his detailed history of communication privacy. See Solove, supra note 10, at 61-64.
